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PRIVATE CHOICE VERSUS PUBLIC HEALTH:
RELIGION, MORALITY, AND CHILDHOOD
VACCINATION LAW
Ross D. SILVERMAN, J.D., M.P.H.,*
AND THOMAS MAY, PH.D.**
State-enforced vaccination of children represents the exercise
of civil authority over individual judgment. While public health is a
valid social good and a legitimate basis for state action (as we will
discuss below), it is not the only good that must be considered when
establishing social policy on immunization. In particular, United
States social policy must seriously consider the effects of state-
enforced vaccination on individual autonomy and freedom. This is
especially true when the freedom in question relates to the expression
of religious and personal beliefs. Religious freedom is perhaps the
most fundamental value underlying the U.S. governmental system, as
illustrated by its prominent place in the First Amendment to the Bill of
Rights. 1
Although most states currently recognize exemption to
mandatory childhood vaccination on religious grounds,2 the courts
have consistently held that public health concerns override religious
beliefs in cases related to childhood vaccination.3  In addition, the
courts have found it legitimate, for example, for local authorities to
* Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Medicine; Assistant
Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.A., Indiana
University; J.D., Boston University School of Law; M.P.H., Boston University School of
Public Health.
** Associate Professor of Bioethics and Director of Graduate Studies in Bioethics,
Medical College of Wisconsin; B.A., Otterbein College; Ph.D., Bowling Green State
University.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. Forty eight states currently recognize exemptions to vaccination on religious
grounds. See NATIONAL VACCINE PROGRAM OFFICE, CENTERS OF DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, NATIONAL VACCINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP ON PHILOSOPHICAL
EXEMPTIONS, Atlanta, GA (January 1998) [hereinafter "NVAC Report"]. Only Mississippi
and West Virginia do not offer an exemption from vaccination requirements based on a parent
or child's religious beliefs. See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, cert. denied 449 U.S. 887, 66
L. Ed. 2d 112, 101 S. Ct. 242 (Miss. 1980) (holding a statute allowing only members of a
"recognized denomination" the opportunity to be exempted from state vaccination laws to be a
violation of the equal protection clause).
3. See discussion infra notes 10 and 14.
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evaluate the sincerity,4 strength and religious basis5 of a person's
beliefs in deciding whether to grant exemption from mandatory
childhood vaccination. The importance of this approach is significant:
where they exist, "rights" often trump considerations relating to social
utility.6 The rights associated with religious freedoms, then, should
not be overridden by public health concerns without sound
justification based on liberal, constitutional principles other than mere
social utility. Furthermore, the exercise of liberal constitutional rights
is not normally subject to an evaluation of the reasons one might
exercise one's right. The right of a competent adult to refuse medical
care, for example, holds independent of the content of that decision, or
7
what it is based upon.
4. In Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F.Supp. 81
(E.D.N.Y., 1987), the court addressed both whether pantheistic beliefs qualified for exemption
under the state school vaccination policy, and to what degree states may examine the sincerity
of a family's religious beliefs. According to the court,
In order for plaintiffs to be afforded the exemption from immunization
that they seek, it is not sufficient merely that the beliefs that they assert as
grounds for exemption be religious in nature. It must also be demonstrated
that the espoused beliefs are sincerely held and that the stated beliefs, even
if accurately reflecting plaintiffs' ultimate conclusions about the
advisability of inoculation of their children, do in fact stem from religious
convictions and have not merely been framed in terms of religious belief
so as to gain the legal remedy desired. Id. at 94.
As the Supreme Court emphasized in U.S. v. Seeger, however: "While the 'truth' of
a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held.'
This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case." U. S. v.
Seeger, 85 S.Ct. 850, 863 (1965). For an example of the application of this passage to a
childhood vaccination case, see Brown v. City of Coming, 429 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1980). For
further discussion of this topic generally, see Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation
Of Religious-Based Conscientious Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 695 (1993).
5. In Mason v. General Brown Cent. School Dist., 851 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir., N.Y., 1988),
the court found that parents have the burden of showing either that they are a member of a
recognized religious organization whose religious tenets object to immunization, or that their
personal and sincerely held religious beliefs lead them to object to immunization. The court
rejected a church purporting to be the "religious" embodiment of the secular chiropractic ethic
that immunization was unnecessary and contrary to one's "genetic blueprint," finding that the
church's lacked all the indicators of a church (e.g., no membership rights, requirement of
active participation, church dignitary status conferred with $5 payments by mail).
Furthermore, the court, while acknowledging that the family had done much to manifest the
chiropractic ethic in their choice of lifestyle, determined that even though such lifestyle
choices may be very important to the family, holding and adhering to such convictions do not
render them beliefs religious. Id.
6. See generally, RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard University
Press, 1977).
7. Assuming, again, that the patient is competent. There are times when the content of
a patient's decision can be an indicator of incompetence; however, even in these cases it is the
concept of capacity for autonomy, and not the content of the decision per se, that mitigates the
right to refuse treatment. See Thomas May, Assessing Competency Without Judging Merit, 9
JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ETHICS 247, 254-57 (1998), and THOMAS MAY, BIOETHICS IN A LIBERAL
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In short, although most states recognize religious exemptions
to mandatory childhood vaccination, public health concerns ultimately
may take precedence over religious beliefs. In this paper, we will
examine the tension between public health and religious freedom that
arises in U.S. childhood vaccination policy. We will argue that
although individual autonomy and religious freedom are important
social goods, the policy of mandatory childhood vaccination, in
particular the recognition of public health concerns as overriding
religious belief, is both legally and morally justified.
I. LAW AND MANDATORY CHILDHOOD VACCINATION
The most common objection to mandatory childhood
vaccination stems from the autonomy-based rights found in the U.S.
Constitution. The earliest Supreme Court case addressing vaccination
issues was Jacobson v. Massachusetts.8  In Jacobson, the Court
considered whether the state has the right to mandate that the public be
vaccinated. The case arose following the adoption of a regulation by
the Cambridge Board of Health mandating that all residents be
vaccinated against smallpox or face trial and a potential fine. Henning
Jacobson, after refusing to be vaccinated, was found guilty of violating
the regulation and ordered to pay a five-dollar fine. Jacobson refused,
and appealed the decision to the Massachusetts Supreme Court9 and
then the U.S. Supreme Court. Before the U.S. Supreme Court,
Jacobson argued that compulsory vaccination laws violated his liberty,
stating "compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive, and hostile to the inherent right of every free man to care
for his own body and health in such a way as to him seem best.""0 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that state police powers
give the State a right to impinge upon individual liberties. According
to the Court, "[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an
SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF BIOETHICS DECISION MAKING (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2002).
8. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
9. Commonwealth v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242 (1904).
10. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. at 11. For more in-depth discussion of the
historical setting of the Jacobson case (but not the legal principles arising out of the decision),
see Michael R. Albert, et. al., The Last Smallpox Epidemic in Boston and the Vaccination
Controversy, 1901-1903, 344 N. ENGL. J. MED. 375 (2001). For further discussion of the legal
significance of the Jacobson decision, see LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 66-69 (2000).
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absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good." 1 Although the Jacobson case was concerned with the forced
vaccination of an adult rather than a child, it is one of three Supreme
Court cases-the others being Zucht v. King12 and Prince v.
Massachusetts 13 -that forms the backbone of the common law
principle supporting the State's power to require vaccination of the
general public, and of children in particular. 14 These cases shed light
on the debate underlying the implementation of public health goals, as
well as the level of scrutiny with which a state may delve into the
sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs. Even though the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of compulsory
immunizations and the First Amendment, 15 through these and other
cases the Court has extensively discussed whether state public health
and safety policies may infringe upon an individual or family's
freedom to practice religion.
In the 1922 case, Zucht v. King,'6 the Supreme Court addressed
the issues of mandatory vaccination, children, and the requirement that
children be vaccinated prior to entering the public school system. The
young woman denied access to school due to the lack of vaccination
argued that the mandatory vaccination law violated her 14 th
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights. 17 The Court,
citing Jacobson, rejected these arguments.' 9
The 1944 case, Prince v. Massachusetts,'9 was a child labor
law case in which a 9-year old child of a Jehovah's Witness family
was stopped from selling religious pamphlets on the street in the
11. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. at 26.
12. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
13. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321.U.S. 158 (1944); See discussion infra.
14. Prior to Jacobson, thirteen states-California, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota
and Virginia-had already passed specific laws excluding unvaccinated children from the
public school system, and a number of state courts had already ruled on the validity of these
types of statutes. See, e.g. Bissell v. Davison, 65 Connecticut 183 (1894); Abell v. Clark, 84
California 226 (1890); State v. Zimmerman, 86 Minnesota 353 (1902); Osborn v. Russell, 64
Kansas 507 (1902); Potts v. Breem, 167 Illinois 67 (1897); Duffield v. Williamsport School
District, 162 Pa. St. 476 (1894); State v. Burdge, 95 Wisconsin 390 (1897); Re Rebenack, 62
Mo. App. 8 (1897); Blue v. Beach, 155 Indiana 121(1900).
15. But see, Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922).
16. 260 U.S. 174, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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evening. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the family's right
to freely practice religion fit, held that the police powers20 afford the
state broad authority to pass laws to protect the public. Additionally,
under the auspices of the parens patriae21 doctrine, the state could pass
broad laws to protect children, even when such laws may conflict with
an individual's religious beliefs.22
These cases provide the legal framework for the principle that
the state may override an individual's religious beliefs concerning
childhood vaccination in favor of public health concerns. The
question remains, however, whether these legal grounds are morally
justified in the context of the liberal, constitutional political system of
the U.S.
20. Larry Gostin defines police power as, "The inherent authority of the state (and,
through delegation, local government) to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect,
preserve, and promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people. To
achieve these communal benefits, the state retains the power to restrict, within federal and
state constitutional limits, private interests-personal interests in autonomy, privacy,
association, and liberty as well as economic interests in freedom to contract and uses of
property." GOSTIN, supra note 10, at 48. Also see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1904).
21. The doctrine of parens patriae describes the role of the state to protect those
incapable of protecting themselves, primarily minors and incompetent persons. See GOSTIN,
supra note 10 at 51-55. This principle originated in English law, where it described the office
of the chancellor, or lord keeper, as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics" in
the kingdom. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 47 (1897).
Also see Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J.
195 (1978); Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting The Rights And Interests Of Competent Minors In
Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075 (1996).
22. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67. In its decision, the Court specifically cited to the right
of the state to compel vaccination of children over a guardian's religiously-based objection.
According to the Court,
[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance,
regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. Its
authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to
control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he
cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for
himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease
or the latter to ill health or death.
Id.
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II. FREEDOM, MORALITY AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE
The single most prominent moral principle reflected in U.S.
social policy and law is "The Harm Principle." 23 The Harm Principle
seeks to protect individual autonomy, while simultaneously
recognizing that in some cases the exercise of one person's autonomy
can threaten another person's freedom to structure their own life and
values. Thus, the Harm Principle seeks to balance conflicting rights
between individuals, thereby providing a basis for limiting rights on
liberal grounds other than mere social utility.24 John Stuart Mill, the
principle's most famous champion, described the principle in this way:
"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
25
The prominence of this principle is demonstrated in the judicial
system's ongoing struggle to base review of legislation on it, both in
the types of cases described in the preceding section, and even where
statutes seem "paternalistic. 26 In Prince, for example, the court uses
the vaccination issue to stress when it is appropriate to override
religious beliefs. According to the Court, a parent "cannot claim
freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for
himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.... [T]he state
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority
in things affecting the child's welfare; and ... this includes, to some
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction." 27  Even
legislation that seems paternalistic, such as laws requiring motorcycle
helmets or seat belt use, has been upheld by courts on grounds that
23. For an excellent analysis of "The Harm Principle," see the following four books by
Joel Feinberg on the moral limits of criminal law: JOEL FEINBURG, HARM TO OTHERS (Oxford
University Press 1984); JOEL FEINBURG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (Oxford University Press 1985);
JOEL FEINBURG, HARM TO SELF (Oxford University Press 1986); and JOEL FEINBURG,
HARMLESS WRONGDOING (Oxford University Press 1988).
24. See, generally, THOMAS MAY, BIOETHICS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL
FRAMEWORK OF BIOETHICS DECISION (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
25. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 13 (The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956) (1859).
26. See KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, 3RD EDITION 28
(Health Administration Press, 1990).
27. 321 U.S. at 166-67.
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Professor Ken Wing, author of the book, The Law and the Public's
Health,28 describes as "tortured judicial logic. ' 29  Describing the
numerous decisions concerning both mandatory helmet legislation and
seat belt laws (which he describes as generally adopting the same
principles and judicial postures), Wing states:
Note, in particular, that with the exception of the
Fries30 decision overturning early helmet legislation, all
of these decisions have attempted to characterize this
type of legislation as an attempt to protect the
public's-not the affected individual's-health or
welfare.
3 1
Mill's basic formulation of the Harm Principle illustrates the
tension between the public health good of vaccination and the exercise
of individual religious freedom. If refusal of vaccination imposes risks
only to the individual who refuses vaccination, state enforcement of
vaccination would seem unjustified on moral grounds. 32 However, if
harm is posed to others, state intervention overriding religious freedom
may be justified.
Prince clearly refers to the harm principle in recognizing the
state's broad powers to protect the public. Interestingly, Prince goes
further, however, by recognizing a strong parens patriae power to
protect children even when this conflicts with the religious beliefs of
that child's parents. While related, this represents a different type of
protection from harm than normally seen as encompassed by the harm
28. WING, supra note 26.
29. WING, supra note 26 at 28. The majority of courts, according to Wing, have relied
on the argument that serious injuries resulting from the failure to wear helmets result in
economic burden to the public. In reviewing mandatory motorcycle helmet legislation,
however, courts have used other "logic," including arguments that a failure to wear helmets
affects third parties because: a serious motorcycle accident will cause a traffic hazard; society
has an interest in maintaining a strong and productive citizenry; and the "well known fact" that
cyclists ride near the center of the road and may therefore cross into oncoming traffic if
injured. Id.
30. People v. Fries, 42 I11. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).
31. WING, supra note 26 at 36 n.3. It should be noted that Fries itself was subsequently
overruled by a decision employing the rationale Wing describes. People v. Kohrig, 113 I11. 2d
384, 498 N.E.2d 1158 (1986).
32. For further discussion of this issue, see Lanie Friedman Ross & Timothy Aspinwall,
Religious Exemptions to the Immunization Statues: Balancing Public Health and Religious
Freedom, 25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 202, 204-06 (1997); Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious
Exemptions to Childhood Immunization Statues: Reaching for More Optimal Balance Between
Religious Freedom and Public Health, 29 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO L.J. 109 (1997).
33. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 165-67.
2001]
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principle. 34 Fundamentally, the parens patriae power justifies state
intervention on the grounds of potential harm to the person for whom
exemption is requested, rather than the public at large or an identifiable
"other." We will argue that both of the types of harms alluded to in
Prince are potentially threatened by failure to comply with mandatory
childhood vaccination.
III. Two TYPES OF HARM
In the context of the Harm Principle, it is important to
recognize that the dangers imposed by refusal of vaccination are not
wholly individual. Vaccines are not 100% effective. There will be,
therefore, a percentage of children who have been vaccinated that
would be susceptible to vaccine-preventable diseases in the case of an
outbreak. For example, during a measles outbreak in Utah, it was
determined that the significant percentage of people exempted in a
particular region led to an environment which made it possible for a
six (viral) generation-long outbreak.35 More than half of those who
eventually contracted the disease had been vaccinated.36
As Feinberg 37 notes, however, we must be realistic in our
understanding of the effects of our actions on others. Virtually no
behavior is entirely isolated from effects on others: people will, at the
very least, have reactions to the conditions they observe others to place
themselves in. To address this, Feinberg argues that we must
recognize that while all behaviors might have effects for persons other
than the person acting, some behaviors will be primarily self-regarding
(only indirectly affecting others).38 To fail to recognize this principle
would result in justified intervention in every area of life, trivializing
the ideal of autonomy. The question, then, becomes one of how
serious a threat is posed by the refusal of vaccination.
Those who are concerned about the dangers of exemptions on
public health have the burden to demonstrate the significance of the
potential harm.3 9 In the absence of such a demonstrated threat of harm
34. Id. at 166-67.
35. Daniel A. Salmon, et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical
Exemptions from Immunization Laws, Individual and Societal Risk of Measles, 282 JAMA 47
(1999).
36. Id.
37. FE1NBURG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 23 at 56.
38. Id.
39. Extensive discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this note.
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to others, the harm principle would seem, at first blush, not to permit
state intervention overriding religious beliefs (at least on the grounds
of potential harm to others).40 According to Mill's basic formulation
of the Harm Principle, the only legitimate grounds for the exercise of
power against an individual's will is to prevent harm to others.
An example derived from one measles outbreak suggests that
exemptions might pose a threat when "clustered" in a given area
(which is not unlikely, given the "clustering" of people with shared
religious beliefs). In Utah, a "clustering" of exemptions to childhood
vaccination six times the national average contributed to an outbreak
of measles. 4 1  This large clustering of exempted individuals
undermined the ability of vaccine programs to achieve "herd
immunity," which prevents outbreaks from establishing a "foothold"
because they cannot spread among those who are immune. 
42
Currently, forty-eight states offer parents the opportunity to
have their children opt-out of vaccination requirements on religious
grounds with Mississippi and West Virginia being the only states not
providing this option. State legislatures, however, are rapidly
expanding exemptions to mandatory childhood vaccination, creating
conditions in which "herd immunity" might be threatened. Fifteen
states have expanded school vaccinations exemptions to include
people who object to vaccination on moral or philosophical grounds. 43
40. We will argue below that the harm principle remains consistent with state
enforcement even if the threat of harm to the general public is low.
41. Salmon, supra note 35.
42. "Herd immunity" may be described as "the resistance of a group to attack by a
disease to which a large proportion of the members are immune, thus lessening the likelihood
of a patient with a disease coming into contact with a susceptible individual." DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th Ed., 1965) as quoted in Paul E. M. Fine, Herd
Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 265 (1993). Also see J.P.
Fox, et. al. Herd Immunity: Basic Concept and Relevance to Public Health Immunization
Practices, 94 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 179 (1971).
43. In varied statutory language and through the use of widely divergent administrative
procedures, the following states recognize philosophical exemptions to vaccinations:
California, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8263(d) (Deering Supp. 1995) ("No standard, rule, or
regulation shall require medical examination or immunization for admission to a child care
and development program of a child whose parent or guardian files a letter with the governing
board of the child care and development program stating that the medical examination or
immunization is contrary to his or her religious beliefs, or provide for the exclusion of a child
from the program because of a parent or guardian having filed the letter."); Colorado, COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 25-4-1704(2) and 25-4-1704(4)(b) (Supp. 1995) ("An infant shall be exempted
from receiving the required immunizations ... Upon submitting a statement signed by one
parent or guardian that such parent or guardian adheres to a religious belief whose teachings
are opposed to immunizations, or that such parent or guardian has a personal belief that is
opposed to immunization."); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4801, 39-4802(2) (1993) ("Any minor
child whose parent or guardian has submitted a signed statement to school officials stating
their objections on religious or other grounds shall be exempt from the provisions of this
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In the 1999-2000 legislative session, at least three additional states
considered expansion of their vaccination statute to include a
philosophically-based exemption. 44
chapter."); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. § 17:170(A)(1), 170(E) (West Supp. 1997) ("No person
seeking to enter any school or facility ... shall be required to comply with the provisions of
this Section if ... a written dissent from the student or his parent or guardian is presented.");
Maryland, 20-A M.R.S. § 6355 (1999) (Child may not be enrolled without an immunization
certificate except when "The parent states in writing a sincere religious belief which is
contrary to the immunization requirement of this subchapter or an opposition to the
immunization for moral, philosophical or other personal reasons."); Michigan, MCL §
333.9215 (1999) and MSA § 14.15(9215) ("A child is exempt from this part if a parent,
guardian, or person in loco parentis of the child presents a written statement to the
administrator of the child's school or operator of the group program to the effect that the
requirements of this part cannot be met because of religious convictions or other objection to
immunization."); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 121A.15(3)(d) ("If a notarized statement [is
submitted] stating that the person has not been immunized ... because of the conscientiously
held beliefs of the parent or guardian of the minor child or of the emancipated person, the
immunizations specified in the statement shall not be required."); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-5-3 (2000) (A child may submit "affidavits or written affirmation from his parent
or legal guardian that his religious beliefs, held either individually or jointly with others, do
not permit the administration of vaccine or other immunizing agent."); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3313.671 (A)(3) ("A pupil who presents a written statement of the pupil's parent or guardian
in which the parent or guardian objects to the immunization for good cause, including
religious convictions, is not required to be immunized."); Oklahoma, 70 OKL. ST. § 1210.192
(1999) ("Any minor child, through the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child, may
submit ... [a] written statement by the parent, guardian or legal custodian of the child
objecting to immunization of the child."); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1 1-302(3)(b)(ii)
(1999) (Requires the submission of a form obtained at and the signing of which is witnessed
by an agent of the local health department that offers "a statement that the person has a
personal belief opposed to immunizations."); Vermont 18 VT. STAT. § 1122(a)(3) (2000) ("A
person may remain in school without a required immunization: ... If the person, or in the case
of a minor the person's parent or guardian states in writing that the person, parent or guardian
has religious beliefs or moral convictions opposed to immunization."); Washington, REV.
CODE WASH. (ARCW) § 28A.210.090 (2000) ("Any child shall be exempt in whole or in part
from the immunization measures ... upon the presentation of ... a [signed and] written
certification that the signator has either a philosophical or personal objection to the
immunization of the child."); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 252.04 (1999) ("The immunization
requirement is waived if the student, if an adult, or the students parent, guardian or legal
custodian submits a written statement objecting to the immunization for reasons of health,
religion or personal conviction."). See also NVAC Report, supra note 2 (stating at least 15
states offer philosophical exemptions); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
STATE IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS, 1994-95 at 22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 1995) (stating that 19 states offer philosophical exemptions). A
thorough discussion of the varied means through which states enforce their religious and
moral and philosophical is beyond the scope of this article; however, several recent decisions
offer excellent insight into steps school boards and health authorities might take to enforce
school vaccination requirements. See, e.g., Turner v. Liverpool Central School District (U.S.
Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y., 2001) as reported in NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, March 20, 2001, at 29; In
re Exemption from Immunization Requested by Susan LePage v. Wyoming, 2001 Wy. 26, 18
P.3d 1177 (2001); 44 Op. Att'y Gen. Mont. 7 (1991).
44. See, e.g. SB 823, 91st General Assembly (Illinois 1999); House Bill 1489 (Missouri
2000); Assembly Bill 155 (New Jersey 2000); Assembly Bill 1390 (New Jersey 2000);
Assembly Bill 1831 (New Jersey 2000). Additional childhood vaccine-related legislation has
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The Utah experience aside, the threat posed by refusals of
childhood vaccination does not appear, at this time, great. The most
recent numbers suggest that few parents45 request exemption from
state vaccination requirements on any grounds. A National Vaccine
Advisory Committee working group on philosophical exemptions
from childhood immunizations concluded that: "Given the small
number of children who are currently exempted from immunization
for any reason, philosophical exemptions do not appear to have a
major detrimental impact on child health and well-being in the United
States at this time."47
The NVAC committee goes on, however, to mitigate their
conclusion with the following cautionary note: "[T]he extent of the use
of philosophical exemptions may change in the future, with a
coincident impact on disease outbreaks among exempted as well as
other not fully protected populations. 48 Although current levels of
exemption do not appear to pose a threat to "herd immunity,, 49 the
type of change in use of exemptions about which the NVAC is
concerned would clearly meet the harm principle's standard for
prioritizing mandatory vaccination over religious freedom. This type
of dramatic rise in exemptions could be but one "media event" away.
50
Other trends suggest that a rise in exemptors is already
underway. In Michigan, the Department of Public Health recently
been proposed-and passed-during recent legislative sessions, including bills proposing to
strike provisions in child welfare statutes that previously provided abuse and neglect grounds
based on a parent's failure to vaccinate their child. S.B. 1305, 92nd Gen. Assem., (Ill.
2001)(amending 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2-10.1).
45. As of 1997, it was estimated that less than 1% of all children entering school
nationwide, and no more than 2.5% of children in any one state, consciously opted out of the
childhood vaccination program on religious or moral grounds. NVAC Report, supra note 2.
But see discussion infra, notes 41 - 45 concerning increasing numbers of children opting out
and the potential risks to society of such trends.
46. NVAC Report, supra note 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Although even this fact is not clear, as we will discuss in the conclusion of this
paper.
50. See E.J. Gangarosa, et. al., Impact ofAnti-vaccine Movements on Pertussis Control:
The Untold Story, 351 LANCET 356 (1998). In Japan in the 1970s, for example, media events
surrounding neurological injuries suffered by two infants alleged to have been caused by the
DPT vaccine led to a public outcry and the elimination of the vaccine coverage requirement by
the government. Subsequently, from 1974 to 1976, the percentage of children vaccinated for
pertussis plummeted from 80% to 10%, and in 1979, a pertussis epidemic occurred, resulting
in more than 13,000 cases and 41 deaths. Id. Similar outbreaks following loosening of
childhood vaccination requirements have also occurred in Sweden, the Russian Federation,
Ireland and Australia. Id. For a broad discussion of the impact of media events on society and
culture, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000).
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reported that in 2000, more than 3% of incoming kindergartners in the
state received waivers. For the first time in several years, the state
reported a decline in the percentage of immunized children in the
incoming class. 5' In Colorado, the number of children receiving
waivers based on philosophical grounds increased by 83% from 1987
52to 1998. This study also found that the relative risk for measles was
twenty-two times greater for child exemptors, the relative risk for
pertussis (whooping cough) was 62 times greater for children in day
care, and that at least 11% of vaccinated children are known to have
contracted their case of measles from someone who opted out of the
vaccination program. The potential harms posed to the public at
large when vaccination levels fall below the threshold necessary to
achieve "herd immunity," then, provide a solid potential ground for
state intervention that overrides individual autonomy, if this critical
threshold is threatened.
The line drawn between the "religious" and the
"philosophical" or "moral," first blurred by the Supreme Court during
the Vietnam War era,54 has all but vanished in the eyes of the law,
further undermining the ability of the public health system to
51. Margarita Bauza, Fewer Kids Get Immunizations: Parents Opt Out, Weigh Health
Risk Versus Benefit, DETROIT NEWS, May 11, 2001, at Al. As the Michigan immunization
outreach program has cost the state over $84 million to run, questions are now being raised
about the advisability of continuing to provide the same budgetary support for the program,
given the slipping numbers. To reduce the funding would only serve, however, to complicate
efforts to maximize the level of disease protection for school-aged children, and potentially
increase the angle of the slippery slope.
52. Daniel R. Feikin, et. al., Individual and community risks of measles and pertussis
associated with personal exemptions to immunization, 284 JAMA 3145 (2000).
53. Id. Sixty-seven percent of the sources of disease could not be pinpointed;
consequently, the actual number of vaccinated children who contracted measles from a non-
vaccinated individual could be significantly higher. Id. Also see Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Interstate Measles Transmission from a Ski Resort-Colorado, 43 MMWR
627 (1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00032422.htm
(visited June 10, 2000).
54. See Welsh v. U. S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970). In this case, the court determined that to
qualify for a "religious" exemption from participation in the war, an individual's opposition
must stem from one's "moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and
that these beliefs be held with strength of traditional religious convictions." Id. Citing U. S. v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 178 (1965), the Court asserts, "The test [for whether an individual
qualifies for exemption] might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition." [citations and
footnotes omitted] Id. at 339. For a discussion of the Seeger and Welsh decisions and the
difficulties of defining the boundaries of religion, see Harlan, in his concurrence, more directly
states that the law must encompass "the class of individuals it purports to exclude, those
whose beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The common
denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held." Id. at 358-
59.
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effectively carry out its goals of protecting children from
communicable diseases. This is compounded by the efforts of some
states, which, while lacking a moral or philosophical provision in their
law, take steps to assist parents with their religious exemption
requests. Some states go so far as to explicitly direct potential
exemptors to web sites with model opt-out forms, or inform those who
inquire that all that is needed to gain an exemption is the appearance of
certain "magic words" in the request. Even those states that in the
past, subjected exemption requests to rigorous scrutiny55 are now
showing signs of lowering the threshold applicants must cross to
qualify for exemption.
56
The trends described above should cause concern about
loosening criteria for granting exemptions to childhood vaccination.
One might not believe that the level of exemption from vaccination
poses enough of a significant public health risk to permit state
intervention based on the Harm Principle. However, all agree that the
harm principle does not prohibit state intervention to enforce
childhood vaccination. The reason for this, as we will see below, is
that because exemptions are requested by parents on behalf of their
children, the strong autonomy-rights inherent in the harm principle
simply do not apply.
IV. LIMITS OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE
The strength of the harm principle as a principle of social
policy is that its emphasis on individual autonomy is consistent with a
number of competing moral approaches. The deontological moral
system of Immanuel Kant, for example, places the concept of
individual autonomy at the center of morality.57 Interestingly, Kant's
theory does this by denying the relevance of contingent, consequence-
58
oriented considerations to moral reasoning. The unique feature of
man, argued Kant, is his ability to be directed by reason (rather than
simply reacting to his circumstances). Moral value, then, is gained
55. See, e.g., Farina v. The Board of Education of the City of New York, 116 F. Supp.
2d 503 (E.D.N.Y., 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate genuine and sincere
religious beliefs which would qualify their children for exemption); Sherr v. Northport-East
Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F.Supp. 81, (E.D.N.Y., 1987).
56. Turner v. Liverpool Central School District (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y., 2001) as
reported in NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, March 20, 2001, at 29.
57. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(James W. Ellington, trans., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981).
58. Id.
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through the purity of moral reasoning, which should be the product of
an autonomous will devoid of the influence of contingent, external
facts and considerations. 59 Mill, on the other hand, was a utilitarian.
The value he placed on autonomy results from several beliefs: first,
that the enjoyment of goods is partly constituted by man's autonomous
pursuit of them; second, that once man has known those goods he will
not lightly give up the forms of happiness for which autonomy is a
necessary ingredient; third, that each man possesses a unique set of
attributes, the development of which are indispensable for his
happiness, and of which the individual is in the best position to know;
and fourth, autonomy is vital for allowing "experiments in living. ' 60
All of these reasons for valuing autonomy are consequential
considerations.
Central to either approach to the value of autonomy, however,
is a crucial presumption: man as a rational, developed agent possessing
the capacity for autonomy. 61 While the particular capacities necessary
for autonomy are contentious,62 it is almost universally accepted that
children do not possess sufficient capacities to be considered fully
autonomous. 63
Because children are not viewed as fully autonomous agents,
the harm principle does not prohibit interference with decision-making
on their behalf in the same way it might when applied to adults. As a
society, we generally believe that allowing parents to make decisions
on behalf of their children is the best way to determine what is in the
child's interests. 64 But this is not always the case, because the right of
59. See THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998).
60. See JOHN GRY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE ch. 2 (1983).
61. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL at 27-53 (John Christman, ed., New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989); SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 7-8 (1990);
THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
LIBRARY (1998).
62. See, generally, THE INNER CITADEL (John Christman, ed. 1989).
63. An exception to this general principle is the "mature minor" doctrine, under which
an individual approaching the age of eighteen may be treated as an adult in the eyes of the law.
See 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 30 (2000); In re E.G., 133 I11. 2d 98 (1989); Committee on Bioethics,
American Academy of Pediatrics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in
Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314 (1995). Frequently, this doctrine is used by states to
justify laws that give minors an opportunity to confidentially consult with a health care
provider for treatment related to reproductive health, mental health, or substance abuse. See,
e.g., Consent by Minors to Medical Treatment Act, 410 I11. Comp. Stat. 210 (2000). But see
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (reaffirming Bellotti). Vaccination programs, however, generally concern pre-school-
aged children--children not eligible for "mature minor" status.
64. See Jack Douglas, Cooperative Paternalism versus Conflictful Paternalism, in
PATERNALISM 171-200 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), (especially pp.
171-174).
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parents to raise their children is not without bounds. For example,
parents can have their children taken away due to neglect or abuse;
65
limits are placed upon Jehovah's Witness parents who refuse treatment
that might be necessary to sustain the life of their child;66 parents must
submit to Mandatory elementary education of their children.67 All of
these phenomena demonstrate a concern with the limits of parental
decision-making when the welfare of their child is threatened.
6F
The opinion offered in Prince69 illustrates this grounding.
According to the Court, "Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child's labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified
merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's
course of conduct on religion or conscience." 70 The court concludes
with what has become an oft-quoted passage in the debate between
parent's rights and public health doctrine: "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow [that] they are free
... to make martyrs of their children.' It becomes relevant, then, to
consider the harms posed to the individual for whom exemption is
requested when that individual is a child.
The dangers of infection from vaccine-preventable disease
have been discussed widely for well over a century.72 Diseases such
as measles, pertussis, and Haemophilis influenza type b (Hib) can lead
to severe injuries to children, including encephalitis, meningitis, and
death. The implementation of successful 73 vaccination programs in the
65. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927,
377 S.W.2d 816 (1964). But see S.B. 1305, 92nd Gen. Assem., (I11. 2001)(amending 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/2-10.1) (eliminating lack of immunization of a child as a sole ground for
abuse and neglect charges under the state Juvenile Court Act and Adoption Act).
66. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
Also see Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing For Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes
Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 157 (1983).
67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 208 (1972).
68. For an interesting treatment of the conflict between the religious beliefs of parents
and state police power, see James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion And Children's Welfare:
Debunking The Doctrine Of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371 (1994). Also see
LaDonna DiCamillo, Caught Between the Clauses and the Branches: When Parents Deny
Their Child Nonemergeny Medical Treatment for Religious Reasons, 19 JOURNAL OF JUVENILE
LAW 123 (1998); Committee on Bioethics American Academy of Pediatrics, Religious
Objection to Medical Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279 (1997).
69. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
70. Id. at 166.
71. Id. at 170.
72. GOSTIN, supra note 10 at 175-87.
73. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ten Great Public Health
Achievements-United States, 1900-1999, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
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74U.S. has led a significant number of parents to lose sight of the ve
real harms that could return with a change in direction of state plans. 7
In sum, significant harms are posed to children who contract
vaccine-preventable disease. This risk would seem to justify state
intervention overriding the parents' religious beliefs or conscience on
the basis of the state's parens patriae powers. Because the harm
principle does not grant to children the strong autonomy rights it
grants to adults, this exercise of parens patriae powers is not
prohibited.
V. EVALUATING THE MORAL LEGITIMACY OF PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW
Let us return, now, to our evaluation of the moral validity of
current legal views of public health, and its priority over religious
belief. Armed with our understanding of the harm principle, we can
see the justification for state enforcement of childhood vaccination.
As we have seen, the Harm Principle presumes competent,
adult individuals who are able to rationally evaluate the benefits and
burdens of their actions in exercising their autonomy. Children do not
qualify for the autonomy-based rights protected by the harm principle,
and so, are the proper subject of state-enforced protections. Studies
have estimated that children exempted from vaccinations are
significantly more likely to contract dangerous, sometimes deadly,
vaccine-preventable diseases than their vaccinated classmates. 76  It
should be clear, then, that state intervention that overrides the religious
beliefs of parents is justified under the parens patriae powers. In
addition, as we have seen borne out in the examples of outbreaks in
Utah and Colorado, 77 when levels of vaccination fall below a threshold
required to maintain "herd immunity," the threat of an epidemic is
posed not only to those who have been exempted from vaccination, but
241 (1999) (in which vaccination is considered one of the great public health achievements of
the twentieth century); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Achievements in Public
Health, 1900-1999: Control of Infectious Diseases, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 621 (1999).
74. W. A. Orenstein & A.R. Hinman, The Immunization System in the United States-
the Role of School Immunization Laws, 17 SUPPL 3 VACCINES 19 (1999).
75. Bruce G. Gellin, et. al., Do Parents Understand Immunizations? A National
Telephone Survey, 106 PEDIATRICS 1097 (2000); Bruce G. Gellin, et. al. The Risk of
Vaccination-The Importance of "Negative" Studies, 344 N. ENG. J. MED. 372 (2001).
76. Salmon, supra note 35 (estimating that unvaccinated children are 35 times more
susceptible to contracting measles than vaccinated children) Also see Feikin, supra note 51.
77. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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also to those who have been vaccinated but who have not achieved
immunity.
While a new president has ushered in a national debate on the
role of religion in society, 78  politicians and public health
administrators are being challenged to reopen a century-old
79
discussion about the balance between individual beliefs, parental rights
and the health and well-being of children and the community at
large. In this paper, we have limited our discussion of the moral
validity of state intervention to grounds related to the harm principle.
The Harm Principle is a minimal, but for this reason non-contentious,
ground for the exercise of civil authority over individual autonomy.
State intervention that overrides individual autonomy should not be
taken lightly, particularly where the exercise of autonomy that is
restricted relates to religious beliefs and practices. However, public
health (and in particular childhood vaccination) represents an area
where state intervention that restricts the exercise of individual
autonomy seems justified, even on grounds as minimal as the harm
principle.
78. Including what, exactly, qualifies as "religion." See Exec. Order No. 13, 1993 CFR
Executive Order 13199 (2001 Compilation) (Executive Order to establish the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives); Peter Edelman, Lecture: Poverty and
Welfare: Does Compassionate Conservatism Have A Heart? 2001 Edward C. Sobota
Memorial Lecture, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073 (2001); Kate O'Beirne, Church (Groups) and State:
The Problem With the Faith-Based Bit, NATIONAL REVIEW, February 19, 2001, at 21; Franklin
Foer & Ryan Lizza, Holy War, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 2, 2001, at 14.
79. Michael R. Albert, et. al., The Last Smallpox Epidemic in Boston and the
Vaccination Controversy, 1901 - 1903, 344 N. ENG. J. MED. 375 (2001).
80. Three authors have offered suggestions as to how to frame such a debate. See
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century, 283 JAMA 3118 (2000)
(suggesting that, when developing public health policy, policymakers should ask themselves
the following questions: (1) What risks are involved?; (2) How effective is the intervention?;
(3) What are the economic costs (to the regulator, the regulated, and the opportunity costs)?;
(4) What are the burdens on individual human rights?; (5) Does the policy offer a fair
distribution of services?) Id. Also see Ross & Aspinwall, supra note 32 at 205-6.
2001]

